Kowalski Warns Against Frozen Fingers on Nuclear Triggers, P. 2

Humphrey Replies to Dodd on the Congo: Some Nonsense About "Prague-Trained Communists." See Pg. 3

I. F. Stone's Weekly

VOL. IX, NO. 36 OCTOBER 2, 1961 WASHINGTON, D. C. 15 CENTS

Bertrand Russell's Solution for the Berlin Crisis

When I talked with Bertrand Russell in London a few weeks ago, I asked him what he would say to Kennedy and Khrushchev if they asked him what to do about the Berlin crisis. Lord Russell proposed that they call a conference in which neutrals would have the deciding vote and put the Berlin question to arbitration. He thought the USSR "very much to blame for demanding change in the status quo by means of military threat" but he also thought the West "very foolish to be so absolutely and pigheadedly determined not to recognize the East German government." When I suggested that on paper the two sides did not seem to be too far from agreement, Lord Russell interjected, "Don't you mean superficial agreement? The real question is who is to be the top dog and the rest is talk." Again he returned to arbitration, "the only solution as to who is to be top dog is to say nobody is to be." Under arbitration nobody would be top dog. For the longer run, Lord Russell suggested a general treaty establishing a system of arbitration as a corollary to disarmament, with the deciding votes in each case to be cast by states not directly involved in the quarrel to be arbitrated. "I don't mean to sound hopeful of this thing coming about," Lord Russell said, "but what I do mean is that if it doesn't there will sooner or later be a nuclear war."

If We Really Prefer World Law

Lord Russell's proposal began to seem less utopian as I listened to President Kennedy's eloquent and moving address to the United Nations and read carefully Mr. Gromyko's answer. The President rose magnificently to the occasion, and he certainly opened the door wide to meaningful negotiation on Berlin and on armaments. Against the backdrop of realities in Washington,* Mr. Kennedy spoke with clarity and vision. But if it is really true, as the President said, that "we prefer world law, in the age of self-determination, to world war in the age of mass extermination," why not offer to do what men do every day in a world of law and that is submit even their most vital interests to adjudication? If we really mean it—and I believe the President does—when we say "let us call a truce to terror," then why not formalize this and make it a reality by offering to lay our cocked pistols aside and take our dispute over Berlin into a world tribunal for world arbitration? If it is true, as Mr. Kennedy said, that a thermonuclear war no longer concerns "the great powers alone," but would "engulf . . . the committed and the uncommitted alike," have the two great Powers a right to impose a death sentence on the rest of mankind in a quarrel over one city which seems as distant and secondary to them as Bizerte or Kashmir or Angola to us? When he said "mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to mankind," he spoke the ultimate truth. But these words become cruel deceptions if we leave them for some vague future which may never come. The place and time to put an end to war, and talk of war, and preparations for war, is in the Berlin crisis and now.

The President said "unconditional war can no longer lead to unconditional victory." The bright phrases do not conjure up the infernal reality of the world after the next war, with Berlin gone, and both sides broken into fragments, savagely warring over food and shelter in a world too devoid of communication to know what has happened, much less

(Continued on Page Four)

*** On page two you can glimpse the tepid weakness of the so-called peace forces in Congress and the light-headed frenzy spreading among the Republicans, even liberals like Mrs. Smith of Maine and Javits of New York.**

Cassandra Suddenly Turns Cheerful

"The American intelligence estimate prepared at the time of the first sputnik gave the Soviets about 500 intercontinental ballistic missiles by the end of this year [1960] . . . During 1958, however . . . new and lower estimates were conveniently revealed by former Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy, during his presentation of the business-as-usual 1959 defense budget. This second set of estimates gave the Kremlin 500 ICBM's by the end of 1961. . . . During 1959, however, the revised estimates were revised [downward] yet again. . . .

"On the face of it, there is something very fishy about these repeated strikingly convenient downgradings of intelligence estimates. How can anyone be so sure that Nikita S. Khrushchev was lying, in late 1958, when he stated that Soviet ICBM's were already in serial production? . . . If he was telling the truth Khrushchev must now have at least 150 operational ICBM's. The highest American authority, the Strategic Air Commander, Gen. Thomas Power has publicly said that 150 ICBM's could 'virtually wipe out' the atomic deterrent. . . . In order to save some hundreds of millions of dollars, the Eisenhower Administration is literally playing a game of Russian roulette with the national future."

—Joseph Alsop, Series on the Missile Gap, put into Congressional Record by Symington Feb. 19, 1960.

"Mixed but broadly encouraging results have been obtained by recent, exceedingly careful recalculation of the probable striking power of the Soviet Union. . . . Prior to the recent recalculation, the maximum number of ICBM's that the Soviets were thought to have at this time was on the order of 200—just enough to permit the Soviets to consider a surprise attack on the United States. The maximum has now been drastically reduced, however, to less than a quarter of the former figure—well under 50 ICBM's, and therefore not nearly enough to allow the Soviets to consider a surprise attack on this country."

—Joseph Alsop, Washington Post, September 25, 1961.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Little Mail Reaching Congress About Berlin Crisis and Much of That War-Minded

A Few Voices But Mostly Tepid Speak Up for Negotiations in the House

Wm. Meyer of Vermont and Byron Johnson of Colorado were badly missed in the House last week. These two "peace Congressmen" defeated in last year's election would have spoken out on the Berlin crisis with the vigor it deserves. As it is, when peace forces on the Hill tried to marshall Congressmen for a series of short speeches bucking the tide of war hysteria, few could be found to speak up and most of those few were timid and tepid. Congresswoman Edith Green of Oregon got a handful of members to speak up with her last Monday, the most outspoken being Kowalski of Connecticut, the one professional Army officer in the House (see box below).

Opportunity As Well As Crisis

Mrs. Green complained that many constituents writing to her "write as though a nuclear holocaust is inevitable. They see no possible areas for negotiation. They infer that to negotiate is to surrender. This assumption," she said, "should be challenged. . . . The American people need to realize that negotiations can benefit both sides" and that while neither side can win all it wants in negotiation," the alternative is nuclear war." Wm. Fitts Ryan (*D., N.Y.*) reported a similar feeling of "fear, frustration and fatalism" and urged that the Berlin situation be "regarded not only as a crisis but as an opportunity" to increase national security by negotiating a zone of disengagement and disarmament in Central Europe.

Kastenmeier (*D. Wis*) pointed out that the idea of a nuclear free zone in Central Europe originated in the West with the Belgian Foreign Minister Van Zeeland, and added "I have seen very few situations where doing nothing but standing firm is the best thing to do." Al Ullman (*D. Ore*) said that while we must be strong militarily "we must also be strong in new ideas." Detroit's John Dingell (*D. Mich*) warned that "cessation of talking may very well mean the beginning of shooting." Clem Miller (*D. Cal*) analyzed the weaknesses in the Communist position and said the West was already negotiating from strength "not only military strength but the strength of freedom, of patience and of an increasing good will" and can negotiate in confidence. Others were considerably less specific. George M. Rhodes (*D. Pa*) called for "calm and flexible negotiation." Joelson (*D. NJ*) said "Honorable peace is, of course, always preferable to war." Wm. S. Moorhead (*D. Pa*) also spoke but so equivocally it was hard to tell just where he stood while John Brademas (*D. Ind*) confined himself to cautiously admonishing unnamed "extremist" Republicans; he put a column by Roscoe Drummond in the Record to support his rather vague position. Jeff Cohelan (*D. Cal*) the previous Saturday limited himself to suggesting that the Berlin situation "is obviously a far-reaching and highly complex matter." His was the weakest of the lot.

More speeches were hoped for as we prepared for press. If any materialize, we will report on them next week. So far the "peace forces" on the left of the Democratic party make John F. Kennedy look like a radical. One trouble is that remarkably few people are writing their Congressmen despite the crisis, and of these few many are war-minded. Every letter helps and more are desperately needed.

The Authentic Flavor of War Madness

"The President . . . referring to events associated with Castro's Cuba . . . said he wanted the record to show that 'our restraint is not inexhaustible.' . . . Neither is our deterrent capacity inexhaustible. It must be revitalized appropriately with actions as well as words. . . . We cannot expect the national will to overcome forever the enervating effects of repeated losses without its being revitalized by the new strength of meaningful victories."

—Senator Margaret Chase Smith (R. Maine) in the Senate Sept. 21, criticizing President Kennedy for not making clearer our willingness to wage thermonuclear war over West Berlin.

"I think the chief contribution of the senior Senator from Maine to our time will be her contribution to its morale and to its fundamental spiritual understanding of the crises which we face. Her address today was in that spirit. I think this question is critically important because the issue 'Better Red Than Dead' will be a real one in this world, and it is high time we steeled our souls and spirits to what it really means. Do we prefer life to slavery?"

—Senator Javits (R. N.Y.) same day.

Kowalski Says Our Fingers Have Too Long Been Frozen on Nuclear Triggers

"Today nothing is as important to this nation as the need to relax the emotional tensions of our people. We have been 'standing firm' so long now with fingers frozen on nuclear triggers that our national nerves are frayed and jagged. And they might well be, for in the past no great nation that mobilized ever demobilized until after a war. I think it is high time we began to challenge the Soviets creatively, with imagination. It is time we take the offensive for peace. This challenge must, of course, rest on two points:

"1) The free society of Berlin must be preserved.

"2) Access to Berlin must be guaranteed.

"But this is not enough. I believe we can do much to improve the whole European situation. I would start by taking the Russians up on their slogans. They have suggested a zone in Europe free of nuclear weapons—and have offered a disarmed central Europe. All right—let us see if this is what they mean. They have offered to take nuclear weapons out of East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia in exchange for a denuclearized West Germany. Such a zone, free of nuclear weapons, would provide a huge cushion of space which would allow a moment of reason before the ultimate irrationality of total war.

"Finally, if we were to link a denuclear zone with a second stage of withdrawal of foreign forces from the zone, we might well begin the retreat of the Red Army from Eastern Europe and thus initiate the opportunity for real freedom in this area.

"Within the context of this challenge, the formalities for settlement of the Berlin and East German crisis would fall into place. I see no future in standing rigidly like wooden soldiers glued to a board. Let us take the offensive for peace."

—Con. Frank Kowalski (D. Conn.) in the House, Sept. 25

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dodd Spear-Heading a "Katanga Lobby" to Build Up Support for Tshombe

Humphrey Defends Lumumba and Gizenga Against Charges of Communism

The junior Senator from Connecticut has been acting like the senior Senator from Katanga. On at least four occasions in the closing days of the session Senator Dodd was on the floor of the Senate (Sept. 8, 11, 13 and 16) to denounce the activities of the United Nations in the Congo as a Communist plot. On Sept. 11 he released the text of a wire to Adlai Stevenson at the UN, and on Sept. 13 of a letter to President Kennedy. The burden of these was to demand that the UN call off its action against Tshombe in Katanga and "take no further action against white officers or white advisers in Katanga province."

Just Another George Washington

The powerful financial interests in the copper and cobalt mines of Katanga have rallied considerable press support for Tshombe. Their lobbyists may hope to repeat the success of the China Lobby. Just as McCarran and McCarthy a decade ago made State Department officials fearful of objective thinking on the China problem, so Dodd may intimidate them on the problem of the Congo. "Nameless subordinates at desk positions" in the State Department were pictured by Dodd as the villains and he put in a resolution (S. Res. 207) for a Select Committee to root them out. The strategy is to identify African nationalism with Communism and to make life uncomfortable for State Department officials who dare think otherwise. In this enterprise Dodd has drawn support from Keating of New York, Thurmond of South Carolina and Yarborough of Texas. The Texan told the Senate (Sept. 16) he has letters from Methodist missionaries calling Tshombe the George Washington of Katanga and saying it is wrong to consider him "as an instrument of a mining company." *

On September 21, Senator Humphrey courageously took on the task of answering Dodd. Dodd's thesis was that by naming Lumumba's Vice Premier Gizenga as Vice Premier of the new Adoula government, the Congo had set up a coalition dominated by Communists. Humphrey said that ever since Lumumba's death "we have fallen into the peculiar habit of describing anyone linked with him in any way as a Lumumbist and as a Communist by association." But Humphrey pointed out that Lumumba himself, after the mutiny of the Congolese armed forces, did not act like a Communist but appealed first to the U.S. and then to the other African states and finally to the UN for help, before turning to the Soviet bloc for the aid refused him elsewhere.

Humphrey told the Senate that Lumumba's "one discernible political objective was to maintain the unity of the Congo at all costs" and that if belief in a unified national State made a man a Communist then most of the African leaders and indeed "the heads of the Belgian, British, French and U.S. Governments are also infected with this purported malady." Humphrey said that as for Gizenga, his Vice Premier, "there are no more grounds for considering Gizenga an actual Communist than there were for so describing Lumumba," and he disposed in an acidly satirical passage of the allegation (see box below) that Gizenga was "a Prague-trained Communist."

Humphrey declared that Gizenga had been the head of the African Solidarity Party which "had the scarcely novel program of emphasizing national as against region and tribal tendencies in the Congo." Tribalism is the principal weapon against the emergent nations of Africa, and regionalism a favored refuge of large private interests like *Union Miniére.* Humphrey said "the most distressing factor to me in this peculiar outburst of support for an independent Katanga" is that this would cut off the normal sources of half the Congo's revenues. "If that happens," Humphrey warned, "the Congo will be the breeding ground of Communist subversion in central Africa."

No Senator Like Dodd For Thickening A Plot

Dr. DODD: With respect to Mr. Khrushchev's criticism of Gizenga—

Mr. HUMPHREY: No, that was Mr. Hammarskjold. I was mentioning his criticism of Mr. Hammarskjold.

Mr. DODD: Yes, of course, his criticism of Hammarskjold. First of all Khrushchev is a devious and cunning character, as we all know. I would not put it beyond him at all to criticize Hammarskjold as a diversionary tactic—and what a wonderful tactic it would be—while the United Nations is establishing a Communist regime [in the Congo]."

—U.S. Senate, Sept. 16

How Long Do You Have to Be In Prague to Become a "Prague-Trained Communist"?

"I am alarmed by the role of the United Nations in fostering the creation of a coalition government in Leopoldville with Antoine Gizenga as Vice Premier and Christophe Gbenye as Minister of Interior. Both of these men are Prague-trained Communists."

—Telegram Sept. 11 from Senator Dodd to Adlai Stevenson.

"We apparently are so susceptible to the need for describing Congolese politicians in doctrinal language that the American press has managed to pin the label of 'Prague trained Communist' on Gizenga and others of his personal entourage. On the basis of all the information I could obtain from the Government, I have found that Mr. Gizenga has spent no more than two months outside the Congo throughout his career. He travelled in Europe from mid-December 1959, until early February 1960. Of those weeks he spent roughly half in Western Europe and the other half in the Soviet bloc countries, and visited Prague, Czechoslovakia, briefly in that latter period.

"All I can say on this score—and I have checked these matters carefully with the security division of the State Department—is that if the Czechs can turn out a dedicated Communist after having a visitor for several days, they have a supernaturally effective indoctrination system.

"On the other hand, this system of indoctrination pales in its impressiveness when we turn to the case of Mr. Gbenye, a Gizenga follower who is now Minister of the Interior in the central government, for he is described as a Prague-trained Communist when apparently he has never been out of the Congo."

—Humphrey Senate speech on the Congo, Sept. 21

* The Union Miniere du Haut Katanga in which (as we pointed out recently in our issues of Sept. 26 and Oct. 10, 1960), the Rockefellers have a large and growing interest.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Spreading Delusions About How Easily We Could Smash the Soviets

(Continued from Page One)

care who has won. If unconditional victory is no longer possible, aren't the conditional gains of arbitration to be preferred to tense negotiations which may break down lest one side or the other appear—in Russell's words—top dog? If as Mr. Kennedy said "we are committed to no rigid formulas" and "seek no perfect solution," if the real concern is to assure "mutual respect" in hammering out a settlement, what better way to assure this than by arbitration?

Bargaining Already Underway

Real fears and justifiable suspicions exist on both sides. The East fears the cloak-and-dagger network which operates out of West Berlin, and the formidably growing military strength of West Germany. The West fears that to recognize East German control over access to West Berlin will allow Ulbricht slowly to choke off the free life of that city and absorb it into his huge jail. It also fears that acceptance of a divided Germany may prepare the way for disillusion with the West in West Germany, a resurgence of nationalism and a new version of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, allying German military and economic power with the Soviet bloc. The East says it is ready to give new guarantees for a free West Berlin and the West says—or at least hints—that it is ready to negotiate new guarantees against a revived militaristic and nuclear Germany. As in an Oriental market, behind the angry pantomime of mutual rejection, the process of bargaining is already underway. The details rather than the principles of a Berlin settlement are the stumbling block: the precise character of the mutual guarantees and the means of enforcing them. Isn't this a feasible task for an international tribunal, and isn't such arbitration implied when both the President and the Soviet Foreign Minister appeal to the United Nations, inviting it to take a hand in this dispute? Don't both see UN arbitration as a face-saving last resort?

The trouble with leaving this way out as a last resort is that we may never get there. A mood of frustration and of a dizzy readiness for war is being spread in our country. On top of the delusions about shelters are being piled new delusions about the weakness of the Soviet Union and the relative ease with which we could smash it. All the forces which exaggerated Soviet power when they wanted bigger arms appropriations are now downgrading Soviet power when they want to prepare the public for war. Alsop's silly latest (see box on page one) and the gory statistics on how many Russians we can kill in *U.S. News and World Report* for Oct. 2 provide examples. The momentum of war psychosis may easily get out of hand. The President, faced by a GOP growing increasingly belligerent and irresponsible, and with all too little peace support in his own party, must take his courage in his hands and begin to build up a sober understanding of the Berlin issue and possible avenues of settlement or be swept away. His speech to the UN—if it is to fulfill its promise—must be the beginning of a great campaign to save our country from madness and the world from war.

But the President cannot do this alone. Too many people demand a saintly abnegation from Mr. Kennedy but will not themselves make the slightest sacrifice in the cause of peace. We need a nationwide movement to counter the idea that the choice is death or surrender; these oversimplifications can be fatal. We also need help from the neutral and smaller powers in the shape of a Grand Design to arbitrate on Berlin, and save the UN by admitting all existing governments (if Pankow as well as Bonn, why not Taipeh as well as Peking?) in a universal settlement to forestall a universal catastrophe.

Political Fallout From Soviet Testing

"The Soviet and Chinese governments move along dictatorial lines. They don't try to get consent of their people for a change in their government's policy. So such policies are not submitted in any sense to the will of the people. This is one of the great lacks in these countries where you don't have real political democracy."

—Corliss Lamont, one of the oldest and most steadfast "friends of the Soviet Union" in the U.S. commenting in a New York radio broadcast Sept. 20 on Soviet resumption of nuclear testing. Dr. Lamont disclosed that 18 days before the Russians resumed nuclear testing, Soviet and Chinese Communist delegates to the Japan Council Against A and H Bombs, voted unanimously for a resolution which said, "The first government to resume tests should be denounced as the enemy of peace and of mankind."

Why Not Place Bulk Orders to Distribute Recent Issues as Means of Education for Peace?

I. F. Stone's Weekly, 5618 Nebraska Ave., N. W. Washington 15, D. C.

Please renew (or enter) my sub for the enclosed $5:

Name .....

Street .....

City .....**Zone**.....**State**.....

10/2/61

Enter gift sub for $2 (6 mos.) or $4 (1 yr.) additional:

(To) Name .....

Street .....

City .....**Zone**.....**State**.....

Shall we send gift announcement? Yes ☐ No ☐

I. F. Stone's Weekly
5618 Nebraska Ave., N. W.
Washington 15, D. C.

NEWSPAPER

Second class postage paid at Washington, D. C.

I. F. Stone's Weekly. Second Class Postage Paid at Washington, D. C. Published every Monday except the last Monday in August and the first in September and the last Monday in December and the first in January at 5618 Nebraska Ave., N.W., Washington, D. C. An independent weekly published and edited by I. F. Stone; Circulation Manager, Esther M. Stone. Subscription: $5 in the U. S.; $6 in Canada; $10 elsewhere. All Mail rates: $15 to Europe; $20 to Israel, Asia and Africa.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED